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ARTICLE

PROFESSIONAL ROLE AND PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN LEGAL ETHICS
KATHERINE R. KRUSE*

Theory and practice come together at the heart of legal ethics—in the
exercise of professional judgment. Sometimes analogized to Aristotelian
practical wisdom,1 professional judgment is “neither a matter of simply applying general rules to particular cases nor a matter of mere intuition” but a
process of bringing coherence to conflicting values within the framework of
general rules and with sensitivity to highly contextualized facts and circumstances.2 The importance of professional judgment has been widely recognized. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct have long called on
lawyers to exercise “sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by
the basic principles underlying the Rules.”3 More recently, the standards
governing the accreditation of American law schools have identified “the
exercise of professional judgment consistent with the values of the legal
profession and professional duties to society” as a professional skill equal in
importance to the skills of legal analysis and reasoning, critical thinking,
problem solving, and legal research and writing.4
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
1. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 41 (1993); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Legal Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 63, 68 (1980); W. Bradley Wendel, Should Law Schools Teach Professional Duties, Professional Virtues, or Something Else? A Critique of the Carnegie Report on Educating Lawyers, 9 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 497, 525 (2012).
2. Postema, supra note 1, at 68.
3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (2011).
4. The most recent proposed changes to the ABA Standards for the Accreditation of Law
Schools list as mandatory learning outcomes for all law students,
competency as an entry-level practitioner in . . . the professional skills of: (i) legal
analysis and reasoning, critical thinking, legal research, problem solving, written and
oral communication in a legal context; and (ii) the exercise of professional judgment
consistent with the values of the legal profession and professional duties to society,
including recognizing and resolving ethical and other professional duties.
STANDARDS REVIEW COMM., SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR
ASS’N, DRAFT AFTER JULY 2011 MEETING (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/con
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This article explores the relationship between the exercise of professional judgment and academic theories about lawyers’ professional role. It
argues that the academic project of developing a coherent conception of
lawyers’ role in the legal system and in society is an important foundational
analysis for the ethical practice of law, but the theoretical project does not,
by its nature, produce tools that practitioners can utilize directly. In exercising professional judgment, a lawyer draws on an implicit underlying understanding of professional role that strikes a balance between competing
professional values, even if the balancing process remains under the surface. A lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment thus contains within it
an operative theory about the role of lawyers in the legal system and in
society. The aspiration of theorists in legal ethics is to bring to the surface
these implicit and operative conceptions of professional role and to subject
them to analysis and critique.
The academic project in legal ethics raises a tantalizing hope: By examining and critiquing lawyers’ implicit and operative theories of professional role, theory can inform lawyers’ day-to-day exercise of professional
judgment, grounding practice in sound political, jurisprudential, and moral
theory. Yet, the dynamic interaction between theory and practice is more
complex and paradoxical than this aspiration assumes. Theory undoubtedly
matters to practice—by any account, an understanding of professional role
plays an integral part in the exercise of professional judgment. Over the past
forty years, legal ethics scholars have made significant theoretical advances,
mounting both sophisticated critiques of the neutral and partisan “role morality” of lawyers5 and building constructive accounts that ground legal ethics in theories of democracy, the function of law in society, and the role of
lawyers in the legal system.6 However, although these theories of legal ethics provide frameworks for ethical decision making, the frameworks remain
necessarily abstract, making it difficult to directly apply them to a specific
ethical question that arises in practice. Moreover, the theoretical project—
taken as a whole—produces a multiplicity of competing theories of professional role, creating an additional layer of questions for practitioners who
must decide not only how to apply a theoretical framework but which
framework to choose.
Although comprehensive theories of professional role are ill equipped
to provide direct guidance to practitioners, the theoretical project in legal
ethics is not merely an academic exercise. Theory matters in mapping the
tent/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/standards_review_documents/nov
2011/20111012_drafts_reporters_notes_november_src_meeting_materials.authcheckdam.pdf.
5. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY 19, 19–23 (2007); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 669–71 (1978); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some
Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (1975).
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998); W. BRADLEY WENDEL,
LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010).
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broad contours within which lawyers exercise professional judgment. The
most useful tools for the exercise of professional judgment are a stable of
well-specified professional values—loyalty to clients, confidentiality, access to justice, respect for the rule of law, and respect for legal process—
and a sense of when it is more or less appropriate to adhere to one value
rather than another. Theories of professional ethics provide a broad and
simplified view of the relationship among these values, revealing the
strengths and weaknesses of prioritizing one value over another, which can
illuminate the choices made in the more complex circumstances of practice.
Moreover, the rigor of comprehensive theory can help to curb the self-serving tendency of lawyers to interpret their professional duties in ways that
benefit themselves rather than either clients or society as a whole.
Part I of this article sets the scene by examining the three-level process
of professional judgment contemplated by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. It traces the pathway of professional judgment from a simple question of legal ethics—involving the ethics of providing financial
assistance to a client—through these three levels: (1) analysis of the language of the applicable rule; (2) analysis of the problem in terms of the
underlying principles and policies that animate the rule; and (3) examination of how competing conceptions of professional role will provide different guidance in ethical decision making. Part II surveys theories of
professional role in legal ethics and the rubrics or frameworks for ethical
decision making that these theories propose or suggest. Part III details the
challenges of employing the rubrics and frameworks created in theories of
professional role directly in the exercise of professional judgment. It argues
that, although theory is not directly applicable to practice, robust theoretical
debate in the field of legal ethics both deepens understanding and sharpens
accountability in the field of legal ethics.
I. THE EXERCISE

OF

PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT

An examination of the interaction between theory and practice in legal
ethics ought to begin at the beginning: with a lawyer facing an ethical question as it might arise in day-to-day practice. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Rules”) rely on lawyer self-governance at the most
basic level of voluntary individual compliance7 not only through minimal
avoidance of the disciplinary sanctions but also through the exercise of professional judgment in areas where the Rules leave lawyers with discretion.8
The Rules encourage lawyers to resolve the “many difficult issues of professional discretion” that arise in practice “through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying
7. MODEL RULES
8. Id.

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 16.
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the Rules”9 and to interpret the Rules based on an understanding of “the
purposes of the legal representation and of the law itself.”10
“Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society,” the Preamble
to the Rules proclaims, and “[t]he fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system.”11 Yet, the
role lawyers play in the legal system and in society remains undefined in
the Rules. In places, the Preamble claims that the Rules themselves define
lawyers’ role in society,12 but the definition provided by the Rules is far
from clear. The Preamble states that “the Rules of Professional Conduct
when properly applied” define the relationship of lawyers to the legal system.13 But the “proper application” of the rules in light of their underlying
principles and with reference to the deeper role of lawyers in society is the
question at issue; it cannot also be the answer. According to the Preamble,
the principles underlying the Rules include “the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds
of the law.”14 But this formulation obscures the most basic questions about
its application: Which of a client’s interests are “legitimate”? How broadly
or narrowly ought a lawyer interpret the notoriously elastic “bounds of the
law”? In attempting to answer questions such as these, lawyers eventually
encounter the more basic questions of professional role that the Rules leave
undefined.
A. Professional Judgment in Action
The downward trajectory of professional judgment from questions of
interpretation of the Rules to its roots in an understanding of lawyers’ role
in the legal system can be illustrated by an example drawn from my clinical
teaching experience:
The Drug Awareness Class: To Pay or Not to Pay?
A student in a juvenile justice clinic represents a 15-year-old
client charged with felony burglary. The client was caught cutting
the tags off of a hat in a retail clothing store. The student successfully negotiated a consent decree for the client, under which the
9. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 9.
10. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 14.
11. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 13; see also id. at pmbl. ¶ 14 (describing the rules as “partly obligatory and
disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer’s professional
role”).
12. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 13 (“The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to
define that relationship [of lawyers to our legal system].”); id. at pmbl. ¶ 14 (the rules are “partly
obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer’s
professional role”). In other places, however, they retreat from that claim. See, e.g., id. at pmbl. ¶
16 (“The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a
lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules.”).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 9.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-2\UST203.txt

254

unknown

Seq: 5

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

7-DEC-12

9:31

[Vol. 9:2

client must stay out of trouble for six months and attend a drug
awareness class. If the client meets these conditions, the charge
will be dismissed; if the client fails to meet these conditions, he
will end up with a felony delinquency adjudication on his record,
which will risk his waiver into adult court if he is arrested for a
felony again in the future. When the student contacts the client
prior to the six-month follow-up hearing, she discovers that he
has not yet attended the drug awareness class. The class, he tells
her, costs $30 and his family has not been able to pay for it yet.
The student wants to know whether it would be an ethical violation for her (or the clinic) to pay the fee for the client’s drug
awareness class.
As the following analysis will demonstrate, the process of exercising
professional judgment in answering this question proceeds through three
levels: (1) identification of the appropriate rule and a determination of
where it requires discretion or interpretation; (2) analysis of the principles
that underlie the rule, explaining its purpose or intent; and (3) decision making within the constraints of those principles, which draws on deeper understandings of the role lawyers are meant to play in the legal system and in
society.
1. Level One: Identification of the Appropriate Rule
The ethical analysis of this question begins with a deceptively simple
question about the language of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The operative rule is ABA Model Rule 1.8(e), which states: “A lawyer shall not
provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation; except that . . . a lawyer representing an indigent client
may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”15
The question in applying the Rule to this situation is whether payment of
the fee for a court-ordered drug education program falls within the general
prohibition against “financial assistance” to a client or the limited permission to pay “court costs and litigation expenses” on behalf of an indigent
client. The Comment that follows this rule provides limited guidance on
interpreting what counts as “court costs and litigation expenses,” describing
as permissible the payment of “the expenses of medical examinations and
the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence.”16 It contrasts these allowable costs and expenses with the dangers posed by permitting lawyers to
“subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their
clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living
expenses.”17
15. Id. at R. 1.8(e) (emphasis added).
16. Id. at R. 1.8 cmt. 10.
17. Id.
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Reading the language of the Rule and Comment, it is difficult to conclude that the payment of the fee for the court-ordered drug education class
is either clearly prohibited by Rule 1.8(e) or clearly allowed. The fee is
connected directly to the court case, and it is a more focused expense than
the more general “living expenses” intended to fall within the rule’s prohibition. Yet, paying the fee is not quite equivalent to paying for a medical
examination or the presentation of evidence, expenses associated with trial
investigation and preparation. The factual investigation in the juvenile case
is over, and the fee for the drug awareness class is associated with the client’s compliance with the court’s judgment. Whether paying the fee ought
to fall within the scope of the general prohibition against financial assistance or the exception for indigent clients appears to be a judgment call that
requires the lawyer to exercise interpretive discretion.
Once interpretive discretion has been located, the question of how that
discretion ought to be exercised comes to the surface. One approach is to
view discretion as complete freedom: If nothing is prohibited or required,
then anything is allowed.18 The question posed by the student was: “Would
it be an ethical violation to pay the fee?” The answer provided by a technical reading of the applicable rule is: “No.” If the student wants to pay the
fee on behalf of the client, she is free to do so; nothing in the Rules of
Professional Conduct constrains her choice. If discretion is unconstrained
freedom, then nothing but the bottom-line disciplinary floor limits a lawyer
in either pursuing her self-interest or following her moral compass. However, this idea of “discretion as freedom” is not the sensitive professional
judgment contemplated in the Rules, which relies on lawyers to seek guidance from the principles that underlie the rules and an understanding of the
lawyer’s role in the legal system and in society.
2. Level Two: Analysis of the Principles That Underlie the Rule
In exercising the sensitive professional judgment contemplated by the
Rules, the lawyer in this case must take into account the purpose that the
prohibition against financial assistance is meant to serve and the reason why
there is an exception for indigent clients. The Comments to the ABA Rules
provide insight into both. The Comment states two underlying policy concerns with providing financial assistance to clients: (1) financial assistance
may distort the client’s objectives by “encourag[ing] clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought”; and (2) by providing financial
assistance, lawyers may acquire “too great a financial stake in the litigation.”19 The specific concern toward which the rule is directed is that lawyers will offer financial assistance to clients as an incentive to litigate a
18. See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1999) (calling this the Regulatory Model of legal ethics).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 10.
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contingent fee case, both drumming up litigation that the clients might not
otherwise be inclined to pursue and giving the lawyer a personal stake in
the client’s recovery as a way of recouping the expenses that were either
loaned or advanced to the client.20 However, these dangers are outweighed
by the policy interest in ensuring access to the courts for indigent clients,
which is served by allowing lawyers to pay the court costs and litigation
expenses that move a case forward.
Interpreted within the larger framework of the policies that underlie
the Rule, the question requires analysis of whether paying the fee for the
client’s court-ordered drug awareness class will distort the client’s objectives or the lawyer’s incentives, or whether it will support and extend access
to the legal process. However, the identification of this larger policy framework for analyzing the question does not necessarily answer the question.
To answer the question of whether paying the fee would distort the client’s
objectives, impair the lawyer’s advocacy, or appropriately extend the legal
process, a lawyer must confront deeper questions about the function of the
legal system and the lawyer’s role within that system—in this case the role
of lawyers for children in the juvenile court system.
3. Level Three: The Role of Professional Role Conceptions
Lawyers appointed to represent children in juvenile court play a complex role: They have adversarial duties similar to defense counsel in criminal cases, yet they fulfill these duties in the context of a problem-solving
court system designed around the ideals of rehabilitation rather than punishment.21 It is notoriously difficult for juvenile court lawyers to draw the line
between adversary criminal defense advocacy that positions them to hold
the system accountable—and, in some cases, frustrate the workings of the
system to attain the client’s goals22—and “best interests” representation of
their child clients that aligns their representation more closely with the rehabilitative goals of juvenile court.23
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 36 cmt. c (2000)
(“Loans for purposes other than financing litigation expenses are forbidden in most jurisdictions
and under this Section. That prohibition precludes attempts to solicit clients by offering livingexpenses loans or similar financial assistance.”).
21. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (discussing that society’s duty to a
juvenile cannot be confined by the concept of merely justice but that the child should be “treated”
and “rehabilitated”).
22. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175,
182–84 (1983); John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney—New Answers to
Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319–21 (1980); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v.
Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2419–20
(1996).
23. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1421–24 (1996); Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime,
62 MD. L. REV. 288, 288–95 (2003).
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Consider this contrast between the reasoning of a lawyer who conceives of her role as “best interests” representation and a lawyer who positions herself in a “zealous advocacy” role in exercising professional
judgment about the ethics of paying the client’s fee for a court-ordered
program:
Will paying the fee distort the client’s objectives in the way
that paying living expenses might distort a client’s objectives in
bringing a lawsuit? Maybe the client’s inability to attend the
court-ordered program isn’t wholly financial; maybe it is based in
a deeper resistance to drug education. A “best interests” lawyer
acting to facilitate the rehabilitative goals of the court might be
concerned that paying the fee for the client would cloak the client’s underlying resistance to treatment and diminish the client’s
sense of responsibility for addressing the problems that brought
him into the juvenile justice system. A lawyer acting in the more
adversarial “zealous advocacy” role would focus on getting the
client out from under the court’s supervision and might be inclined to pay the fee as the most expedient way of getting the
charge dismissed.
Will paying the fee give the lawyer a personal stake in the
matter? Although paying a $30 fee is not a large financial investment, it may still create a personal stake for the lawyer with consequences for the lawyer’s advocacy at future hearings, especially
if the client fails to attend the program after the lawyer pays the
fee. A lawyer who conceives of her role as “zealous advocacy”
might be concerned that her level of personal involvement would
compromise her advocacy for the client if she pays the fee and the
client still fails to attend the program. She may know too much
about why the client was unable to attend the program, or she
might feel a sense of personal betrayal that would compromise
her advocacy. A “best interests” lawyer, who conceived of her
role as facilitating the client’s rehabilitation, would be more comfortable with transparency and experience less pause about the
effect on her advocacy in the future should the court question her
about why the client had been unable to complete a rehabilitative
program after the lawyer had paid the fee.
Does paying the fee support and extend access to the courts?
If the client truly cannot afford to pay the fee of the court-ordered
program, paying the fee on the client’s behalf might be seen as an
extension of access to the court. In that case, a “best interests”
lawyer might see paying the fee on the client’s behalf as facilitating the court’s rehabilitative goals. However, a “zealous advocacy” lawyer focused on holding the court accountable in a more
systemic way might find it more appropriate to go back to the
court and advocate for a waiver of the fee, insisting that if the
program is important for the client’s rehabilitation and failure to
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attend it creates legal consequences for the client, then the program should be provided at no cost.
A lawyer who is making decisions at this level probably does not have
a fully-developed comprehensive conception of her role in the legal system.
For example, most juvenile defense lawyers find themselves somewhere in
between the two models sketched out above, drawing on both traditional
models of criminal defense advocacy and some measure of “best interests”
representation to reconcile the benefits of each approach to their clients and
to the legal system.24 But, as Barbara Babcock has pointed out, even traditional criminal defense advocacy is not monolithic; criminal defense lawyers justify their role in “defending the guilty” by grounding it in a variety
of different reasons, which suggest different relationships between defense
lawyers, their clients, and the criminal justice system.25 Like most criminal
defense lawyers, Babcock describes her own reasons for finding criminal
defense work rewarding as an “amalgam” of the conceptions she describes.26 Similarly, as I have explored in more detail elsewhere, what is
called “client-centered representation” can be seen as shorthand for a plurality of lawyering approaches, each of which honor the value of client autonomy, and some of which tolerate significantly greater intervention into the
client’s decision-making process than others.27
Even without a fully developed comprehensive theory of role, the
questions that a lawyer finds salient in an analysis such as the one sketched
out above will suggest a conception of professional role that prioritizes and
balances the strains of zealous advocacy and best interests representation in
the circumstances at hand. And, this implicit understanding of professional
role is likely to characterize that lawyer’s approach to juvenile defense
practice more generally. As the lawyer makes choices over time, a more or
less coherent operative theory of professional role will emerge. Even if the
specifics of that role conception remain under the surface, the lawyer will
be living out a theory of professional role.
B. Implicit and Operative Theory
The vision of sensitive moral and professional decision making guided
by underlying principles and grounded in deeper understandings of the role
and function of lawyers in society is not limited to legal ethics. Nor is the
idea that in exercising professional judgment a lawyer will be living out a
24. See Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers Should Be Lawyers, But What Does That Mean?: A
Response to Aiken & Wizner and Smith, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 49, 99 (2004).
25. Babcock, supra note 22, at 177–78 (explaining the Garbage Collector’s Reason, the Legalist’s Reason, the Political Activist’s Reason, the Social Worker’s Reason, and the Egotist’s
Reason).
26. Id. at 178.
27. Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 369 (2006).
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theory of professional role, which operates implicitly under the surface of
the lawyer’s choices over time. The vision of professional decision making
that the Rules invoke is rooted in familiar theories of jurisprudence and
adjudication.
Ronald Dworkin opens his jurisprudential classic, Law’s Empire, with
a description of the majority and dissenting opinions in four well-known
appellate cases from England and the United States in which the judges
diverge in their legal interpretations of statutes or precedent.28 In deciding
such cases, Dworkin argues, judges develop “working theories about the
best interpretation of their responsibilities.”29 One of Dworkin’s most wellknown examples, Riggs v. Palmer,30 is a nineteenth-century probate case
establishing that murderers cannot inherit from their victims.31 According
to Dworkin, a judge whose working theory of adjudication denies courts the
authority to look past the plain terms of the statute will decide a case like
Riggs in favor of the murdering grandson; a judge who believes that adjudication properly includes an analysis of the purposes underlying the statute
will rule against the grandson.32 These working theories of adjudication are
grounded in judges’ convictions about “the point—the justifying purpose or
goal or principle—of legal practice as a whole.”33 Any argument advanced
by a judge thus “assumes the kind of abstract foundation jurisprudence offers, and when rival foundations compete, a legal argument assumes one
and rejects others.”34 Even when a judicial opinion is dominated by citations and facts rather than explicit discussion of jurisprudential theory,
Dworkin argues, the opinion contains within it a hidden legal philosophy.35
So it is, I argue, with theory and practice in legal ethics. When lawyers
engage in the kind of “sensitive moral and professional judgment” contemplated by the ABA Model Rules—looking to the principles underlying the
Rules as a guide to ethical decision making—they draw on implicit conceptions of a lawyer’s role in the legal system and in society. The example of
the juvenile defender trying to decide whether to pay the fee for a courtordered drug education class illustrates the process within a particular field
of law practice.36 And, the question of how to balance competing conceptions of role arises more generally as well. Lawyers exercising professional
judgment draw on conceptions of role in deciding the scope and meaning of
their professional duties as they make case-by-case decisions about any
number of questions: when and whether to reveal confidential information;
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15–30 (1986).
Id. at 87.
Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 15–20.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87–88.
Id. at 90.
Id.
See supra Part I.A.
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whether the representation of different clients will pose a conflict of interest
for themselves or for their firm; on which representation decisions to consult their clients; and on what decisions to defer to their clients.
Theories of professional role in legal ethics focus on the lowest level
of analysis in the exercise of professional judgment—the level that remains
largely implicit in ethical decision making—and seek to develop comprehensive conceptions of the lawyer’s role based on the nature of the adversary system of justice or the function of law in a liberal democratic
society.37 Like Dworkin’s constructive interpretation of social practice,
these theories begin with the common understanding or dominant conceptions of professional duty and professional role that operate implicitly
within legal practice and use theory to either critique or reconstruct legal
ethics based on the role lawyers play in the legal system and in society.38
II.

THEORIES

OF

PROFESSIONAL ROLE

IN

LEGAL ETHICS

The theoretical project in legal ethics has spawned a variety of critical
and constructive accounts of lawyers’ role in the legal system and in society. This part lays out the three best-developed theories of professional role
in legal ethics: moral activism, contextual justice, and fidelity to law. Each
theory proposes and defends a single value—morality, substantive justice,
or respect for the rule of law—as the organizing principle that coordinates
lawyers’ conflicting duties to clients, to the legal system, and to society,
grounding professional duties in deeper moral, political, or jurisprudential
theory about the role of lawyers. Each theory also offers a rubric or framework for producing answers to tough ethical issues that reflects the proper
coordination and priority of the competing moral and professional values
that the theory has coordinated. This part provides a thumbnail sketch of
each of these competing theories, focusing on the rubrics or frameworks
that each offers to practitioners as a guide to ethical decision making. Part
III will take up the question of why these rubrics or frameworks fail to
provide direct guidance in the exercise of professional judgment.
A. Moral Activism
In the view of the early critics of the lawyer’s professional role, the
moral justifications for the lawyers’ neutral, partisan advocacy were too
weak to underwrite zealous pursuit of client objectives that trampled on the
37. See, e.g., TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPLAWYER’S ROLE 1–14 (2009); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 3–5 (2008); WENDEL, supra note 6, at 17–29.
38. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104–27 (1986);
SIMON, supra note 6, at 7–25; WENDEL, supra note 6, at 17–29.
TION OF THE
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rights of others and caused harm to third parties and to society.39 The target
at which the early critics aimed—often called the “standard conception” of
the lawyer’s role40—was a caricatured version of zealous advocacy in
which the lawyer pursues the legal interests of the client by stretching the
bounds of the law to fit the client’s unbridled pursuit of wealth, freedom,
and power.41 Moral theorists argued that the standard conception captured a
lawyer’s moral duties in some kinds of legal practice, most notably criminal
defense.42 However, they argued, lawyers unreflectively invoke their adversarial role as an excuse to visit morally unjustifiable harm on innocent third
parties outside the contexts in which partisan zeal is justified: in non-litigation settings where no third-party arbiter is present to provide a check on
partisan zeal43 and in civil suits between private parties, where truth seeking
takes precedence over the protection of individuals against state power.44
In the best-known and most sustained theoretical critique of lawyers’
professional role morality, David Luban argued that the lawyer’s partisan
role must be morally justified by showing that the behavior is required by
the advocate’s role in the adversary system and that the adversary system is
itself morally justified.45 Luban went on to systematically demolish the familiar arguments justifying the adversary system: that it is the best way to
determine truth, the best way to protect legal rights, and the best way to
reflect society’s commitment to enhancing personal autonomy and protecting human dignity.46 Luban concluded that none of these arguments are
satisfactory moral defenses of the adversary system outside of the criminal
defense paradigm, a context he defined to include the representation of relatively powerless clients seeking redress or defending their rights against the
state or other economically powerful institutional players.47 Outside the
criminal defense paradigm, Luban argued, the adversary system is justified
only by the weak pragmatic argument that it “seems to do as good a job as
any at finding truth and protecting legal rights” and “the costs of replacing
it outweigh the benefits.”48
Luban’s framework for resolving questions of professional ethics that
arise in day-to-day practice depends heavily on the moral justification for
the lawyer’s zealous advocacy role. Rather than permitting lawyers to justify their behavior with rote appeals to professional role, Luban urged a
39. Postema, supra note 1, at 74–81; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 671; William H. Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 32–33;
Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 15–24.
40. Postema, supra note 1, at 73; LUBAN, supra note 5, at 20.
41. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 5, at 24–26.
42. Id. at 58–62.
43. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 671.
44. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 58–66.
45. Id. at 133–37.
46. Id. at 68–92.
47. Id. at 58–66.
48. Id. at 92.
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“fourfold root” analysis, in which lawyers take into account the strength of
the moral justification for their role in deciding whether to adhere to or
break from role to prevent harm to third parties.49 In deciding whether to
break from role under Luban’s rubric, the lawyer must take into account:
(1) the moral justification for the adversary system of justice; (2) how essential the role of partisan advocate is to the proper functioning of that
system; (3) how essential the obligation of zeal is to the fulfillment of the
role; and (4) whether the act is required to fulfill the obligation of zeal.50
Each of these factors should be viewed, Luban argued, as links in a chain of
moral justification for a role-determined action. The moral argument operates as a cumulative weight test that “may be undermined at any of its
links.”51 A weak argument at any link within the chain diminishes the
weight of the justification at ensuing steps.52
Luban’s fourfold root structure becomes clear when you contrast its
operation in contexts where the adversary system is strongly justified with
its operation in other contexts, where partisan advocacy is only weakly justified. In the criminal defense context, Luban argued, zealous partisan advocacy “has weighty justifications” that “can support broad institutional
excuses”;53 however, in the civil suit paradigm, “the adversary system
doesn’t excuse much more than the most minor deviations from common
morality.”54 Under Luban’s structure, the weight of justification at the first
step—the justification for the adversary system itself—is passed along the
chain in deciding whether the moral justification for adhering to professional role outweighs the moral reasons to break from professional role.
Hence, lawyers representing Robert Garrow in the infamous Lake Pleasant
“hidden bodies” case were morally justified in keeping confidential the information they learned from their client about the location of bodies of his
previous murder victims despite the anguish it caused to the missing victims’ families.55 In the criminal defense paradigm, according to Luban’s
rubric, confidentiality is strongly justified by “the positive moral good of
overprotecting individual rights against encroachment by the state.”56 But
49. Id. at 128–47. Luban clarified his views in David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in
Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424 (1990).
50. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 132.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 134.
53. Id. at 148.
54. Id. at 149.
55. Id. at 53–54, 149. In this case, lawyers Frank Armani and Frank Belge represented serial
killer Robert Garrow in a murder in upstate New York. Garrow confessed to them that he had
committed additional murders and informed them of the location of the bodies of three of his
victims. Belge and Armani confirmed the information but did not report the information to the
authorities until Garrow agreed to reveal it as part of an insanity defense. The lawyers also failed
to respond to direct pleas from the families of the victims for information about their missing
relatives. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
164–75 (2d ed. 2008).
56. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 149.
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this is not the case with the lawyers defending John Zimmerman in a personal injury lawsuit who failed to reveal to the plaintiff that their defense
expert had discovered in his examination that the plaintiff had a life-threatening aortic aneurysm possibly caused by the car accident.57 Because the
Spaulding case occurred in the civil suit paradigm, the weak justification
for the adversary system was passed on along the chain of the fourfold root
analysis and was insufficient to justify the moral harm of maintaining the
confidentiality of that potentially life-saving information.58
Luban’s theory of legal ethics creates a theoretical framework that subsumes role obligation into moral obligation. A lawyer’s professional duties
become a subset of the lawyer’s other moral duties, and his theory provides
a common metric of moral analysis for weighing and balancing moral and
professional duties in making decisions about adherence to or deviation
from professional role in specific circumstances.
B. Contextual Justice
William Simon has developed a political and jurisprudential framework for the exercise of professional judgment that ties lawyers’ decision
making in particular cases directly to the underlying principles and values
of law and legal process.59 Simon joined the early critics of the standard
conception of legal ethics, arguing that all of the available justifications for
neutral, partisan legal ethics are incoherent and fail on their own terms.60
However, he departed from the early critics’ focus on improving the moral
agency of lawyers and focused instead on constructing “a jurisprudential
argument for the improvement of the lawyer’s role” that incorporated a
broader range of public values into day-to-day lawyering decisions.61
Rather than seeing the relevant public values as springing from lawyers’
personal moral judgments, he saw them as growing out of lawyers’ professional roles.62
Simon’s primary target was the categorical nature of professional ethical judgment under what he called the “dominant view” of legal ethics.63
The dominant view of legal ethics endorses the idea that “the lawyer
57. John Zimmerman was the driver of a car in an accident that injured his neighbor and
coworker, David Spaulding. Zimmerman’s lawyers learned in discovery that Spaulding had a lifethreatening heart aneurysm that may have been caused by the accident. Although this information
was unknown to Spaulding, Zimmerman’s lawyers did not reveal it to them. Instead, they went on
to settle the case. When Spaulding later learned about his condition, he moved to reopen the
settlement. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 706–07 (Minn. 1962); see also Roger C.
Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman
Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 63–65 (1998).
58. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 150.
59. SIMON, supra note 6, at 10.
60. Id. at 36–37.
61. Id. at 17.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 9.
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must—or at least may—pursue any goal of the client through any arguably
legal course of action and assert any nonfrivolous legal claim” without regard to its effect on third parties or the public good.64 Lawyers who accept
the dominant view, Simon argued, adhere categorically to professional
norms like loyalty, confidentiality, and partisan zeal even when they lead to
injustice in particular cases.65 The disregard for the public interest in the
dominant view is typically defended by the argument that adherence to categorical professional norms serves justice in the long run: Strict rules of
confidentiality encourage clients to disclose sensitive information; zealous
partisan advocacy is the best way to ferret out the truth.66 Yet, Simon argued, the behavioral assumptions on which these essentially empirical
claims are based have remained untested.67 According to Simon, the argument that a client has a right to pursue injustice is similarly flawed; it makes
sense only against the problematic backdrop of libertarian political theory
and formalist jurisprudence.68
Simon proposed replacing the various categorical norms in legal ethics
with a single imperative that lawyers exercise contextualized judgment to
“take such actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice,” or as he interchangeably called it,
“legal merit.”69 The equation of “justice” and “legal merit” in Simon’s theory of legal ethics rests on both a broad definition of law and a narrow
definition of justice. In a jurisprudence influenced heavily by Ronald Dworkin, Simon argued that determinations of legal merit are not limited to the
positive law enacted by legislatures and courts but include assessment of
the underlying principles and background values that justify the law.70 Justice, as Simon used the term, is not an extra-legal concept based in moral
principles but is the best understanding of the background values, principles, and purposes immanent in the law that make the law coherent and
establish its legitimacy.71 Legal merit and justice come together through the
process of examining the law in light of its underlying principles and the
background values that align law with justice.
In making judgments about the actions most likely to promote justice,
lawyers must also take into account a threshold question of institutional
competence, comparing their own capacity to reach reliable determinations
64. Id. at 7–8.
65. SIMON, supra note 6, at 53.
66. Id. at 54–68.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id. at 26–27.
69. Id. at 9, 138.
70. Id. at 38–39; see also David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 873, 886–87 (1999) (discussing the influence of Dworkian jurisprudence on Simon’s theory
of legal ethics).
71. SIMON, supra note 6, at 138–39.
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of justice with that of other legal officials.72 The adversary system assigns
lawyers the role of client advocates, Simon posited, because judges and
other legal officials are usually better positioned than lawyers to reach reliable determinations of justice.73 In situations where the system is functioning
effectively, lawyers can suspend their own assessments of legal merit, pursue partisan objectives, and assume that the judgment of other legal officials about what outcomes best accord with justice.74 However, when an
adversary or an official decision maker “lacks information or resources to
initiate, pursue or determine a claim” or where officials are “corrupt, or
politically intimidated, or incompetent,” lawyers must take direct responsibility for achieving substantive justice—even if that means foregoing legal
arguments that the lawyer might otherwise be able to make on the client’s
behalf.75
What at first sounds like a fairly straightforward maxim—that lawyers
should “take such actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of the
particular case, seem likely to promote justice”—turns out to be surprisingly complex in its application.76 Lawyers’ commitment to contextual justice and legal merit may require them to forego possible literal
interpretations of law that would benefit their clients.77 Conversely, it may
require lawyers to disregard or nullify laws that are inconsistent with the
deeper underlying principles and background values that render the law legitimate.78 Simon’s contextual approach usually requires lawyers to interpret the law according to its intended purposes though lawyers must remain
“alert for indications that a purposive approach” will not further the interests of justice.79 The contextual view does not completely rule out lawyers’
use of partisan tactics; but in deciding how far to go, lawyers must consider
the balance of advocacy and the institutional competence of officials to
reach reliable determinations of justice. What most differentiates the contextual judgment approach is the kind of consideration that takes primacy in
lawyers’ professional judgment: In all cases, lawyers’ primary commitment
must be to promoting justice, not to advancing their clients’ interests or to
following their own moral compasses.

72. Id. at 139–40; see also Simon, The Legal and the Ethical: A Brief Rejoinder to Comments
on The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1004 (1999) (clarifying that the analysis of
institutional competence is a threshold question).
73. SIMON, supra note 6, at 139–40.
74. Id. at 138–39.
75. Id. at 140.
76. Id. at 9, 138.
77. Id. at 50–52.
78. Id. at 77–108.
79. SIMON, supra note 6, at 145.
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C. Fidelity to Law
Bradley Wendel has provided the most recent comprehensive theory of
professional role in his book, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, reinterpreting
and defending the traditional principles of partisanship, neutrality, and
moral nonaccountability in light of the function of law and lawyers in a
liberal democracy.80 Like Simon, Wendel focused his redefined theory of
legal ethics on the lawyer’s obligation to “act on the basis of her clients’
legal entitlements, not her clients’ interests or her own views about what
substantive justice requires.”81 However, Wendel rejected Simon’s vision
of contextual justice, and the Dworkian jurisprudence on which it is based,
on the ground that its reliance on background values ends up importing the
lawyer’s extra-legal normative judgments into the interpretation of legal
merit.82 Fidelity to law, Wendel argued, requires positivist interpretation of
law, which is significantly more deferential to the public processes of
lawmaking.83
Wendel’s theory of legal ethics is grounded in a deeper theory about
the function and legitimacy of law in a liberal democracy characterized by
deep, persistent, and ultimately irreconcilable normative controversy. In a
society characterized by reasonable moral pluralism, Wendel argued, citizens will disagree about the normative criteria for measuring justice.84 Law
provides a way to transcend normative controversy and transform contested
normative claims into agreed-upon criteria of legality.85 Law deserves respect even from those who disagree with its content, Wendel argued, because law establishes a stable framework within which citizens can
coordinate their activities despite their differences.86 Fidelity to law is underwritten by the normative attractiveness of democratic lawmaking
processes, which “manifest respect for the equality and dignity of all
citizens.”87
In practical terms, Wendel’s fidelity-to-law conception of the lawyer’s
role in society precludes gamesmanship and sharp practices that toy with
the ordinary meaning of law as understood within the accepted interpretive
practices of lawyers, judges, and other participants in the legal system.88 To
play games with legal interpretation is to disregard the enactments of the
political community in favor of one’s own interests.89 It also precludes law80. WENDEL, supra note 6, at 5–8.
81. Id. at 48.
82. Id. at 46–48. Luban has raised a similar critique of Simon’s theory of legal ethics. Luban,
supra note 70, at 885–88.
83. W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 382–83 (2004).
84. WENDEL, supra note 6, at 88.
85. Id. at 91–92.
86. Id. at 87–88.
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id. at 190–94.
89. See id. at 196.
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yers from nullifying unjust laws covertly or “dress[ing] up moral advice as
a judgment about what the law permits.”90 When one holds oneself apart
from the intended reach of law, Wendel argues, it exhibits disrespect for the
equality and dignity of other citizens91—whether one does so to promote a
client’s interests or out of a personal sense of morality or justice.92
However, Wendel conceded that even within his fidelity-to-law conception of legal ethics, some amount of interpretive judgment is required.
“If it were possible to read the meaning of law directly from legal texts,”
Wendel wrote, the lawyer’s basic job of ascertaining and protecting a client’s legal entitlements would be fairly straightforward.93 However, because the interpretation of legal requirements is notoriously indeterminate,
lawyers must exercise interpretive judgment about the relative plausibility
of possible interpretations.94 Such interpretive judgment does not provide a
free-for-all of unbounded discretion, he argued, because interpretation is
“fundamentally a community-bound process” that draws on intersubjective
criteria for validity.95 Lawyers, Wendel argued, should approach the law
from a Hartian “internal point of view,” which acknowledges law as a
source of reasons for action and draws on specifically legal materials—
statutory texts, cases, legislative history materials, underlying principles,
and canons of interpretation—as resources for conforming behavior to the
community’s resolution of contested normative issues.96
Rather than providing a specific rubric for ethical decision making,
Wendel argued that legal interpretation is best thought of as a craft defined
by internal standards of good practice.97 Drawing on Aristotelian conceptions of virtue ethics, Wendel argued that the excellence of good lawyering
is judged by how well or poorly a practitioner achieves the ends of law
practice.98 Because Wendel views the function of law as the settlement of
normative controversy in society, his theory of legal ethics holds lawyers
responsible for “preserv[ing] the common framework of law and respect for
legal institutions” that promotes law’s goal of stability and social
coordination.99
Each of the foregoing theories in legal ethics provides a coherent and
comprehensive conception of professional role that is well justified by its
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

WENDEL, supra note 6, at 139.
Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 8–11.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 185–87.
Id. at 196.
See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1492–98 (2006) (discussing how the Hartian “internal point of view”
applies to lawyers).
97. WENDEL, supra note 6, at 184.
98. Id.; see also Wendel, supra note 1, at 525.
99. Wendel, supra note 83, at 366.
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proponents on the basis of sound moral, political, or jurisprudential theory.
Moral activism subsumes professional obligation into common morality, requiring that the moral justification for a lawyer’s professional duties outweigh any moral harm caused by adhering to them.100 The contextual view
prioritizes the duty to promote substantive justice over competing duties to
pursue client interests or even to obey the positive law, interpreting those
other duties as means toward the end of achieving substantive justice.101
Fidelity to law underscores respect for the rule of law in a liberal democracy as an organizing principle that limits partisan duties to the protection
of a client’s legal entitlements, as those entitlements are understood within
the accepted interpretive practices of the relevant legal community.102
It would seem to follow that theories of professional role could usefully provide direct guidance in the exercise of professional judgment. After
all, as Part I demonstrated, the exercise of sensitive professional judgment
ultimately turns on implicit operative understandings of the role that lawyers play in the legal system, and theories of professional role bring to the
surface and define more clearly the conceptions that operate at the shadowy
lower levels of professional judgment. However, as the next part argues, the
interaction between theory and practice is not as simple as it seems.
III. THEORY

AND

PRACTICE

IN

LEGAL ETHICS

While theory abstracts, simplifies, and unifies, practice remains complex, multivariable, and deeply contextualized. The abstraction of theory
from real-life complexity makes theory difficult to access as a direct guide
to practical judgment, and the multiplicity of competing theories that result
from academic discourse reduces the prospects that any theory will be acceptable as the one true guide to judgment. After exploring these challenges, this part examines the pragmatic use of theory in medical ethics to
argue that lawyers in practice may be better served by viewing their conflicting professional obligations as plural sets of professional values—loyalty to clients, confidentiality, access to justice, respect for the rule of law,
and respect for legal process—than they are by trying to resolve those conflicting values into a single, simplified theory. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the theoretical project of creating and critiquing
unified and simplified comprehensive theories of professional role has no
use to the pragmatic project in legal ethics. This part concludes that theoretical debate sets helpful parameters around the exercise of professional judgment by providing a check against self-interested manipulation of
professional values and in shaping our understanding of the situations in
which different professional values tend to have priority.
100. See supra Part II.A.
101. See supra Part II.B.
102. See supra Part II.C.
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A. Problems with Utilizing Theories of Professional Role to Guide
Professional Judgment
Theorists in legal ethics have both acknowledged and responded to one
kind of criticism about the utility of theory to practice: that the rubrics they
lay out for the exercise of professional judgment are too complex for ordinary lawyers to use in practice. However, this criticism does not pose the
biggest problem to using theory as a guide to practice. The more fundamental problems are that a good theory necessarily oversimplifies and abstracts
from the messiness of real life in ways that make it inaccessible and that,
taken as a whole, the theoretical project spawns multiple theories to choose
from and no clear way to make the choice among them.
1. What’s Not the Problem: Complexity
One possible problem with applying theory directly to practice is the
perceived complexity of the rubrics or frameworks that theorists in legal
ethics provide. For example, in explaining his theory of legal ethics, David
Luban laid out a seven-step process for applying the fourfold root structure
he offered for balancing the morality of a professional role against the
moral harm associated with deviating from professional role.103 Luban conceded that “[i]t seems like a lot to ask; it all looks like a veritable night in
Gethsemane every time a lawyer wants to take what might be described in
some circles as ‘a lousy four-bill landlord-tenant case.’”104 Simon’s contextual justice theory of legal ethics has been criticized as requiring Herculean
intellectual efforts that are “too strenuous for ordinary decision-making by
ordinary lawyers.”105 As critics point out, to determine what justice requires
in the relevant circumstances of a particular case under Simon’s theory,
lawyers must understand what the law formally requires and prohibits; analyze the extent to which the law’s formal requirements are justified by the
law’s underlying purposes, deeper principles, and background values; and
assess the lawyer’s institutional competence to determine substantive justice compared to other institutional actors.106 Such complex and professo103. His step-by-step process was as follows:
1. Identifying the institution, the role, the role obligation and the role act.
2. Assessing the institution, role and role obligation in the light of the ends they are to
serve.
3. Applying the minimum-threshold test: determining whether, at each link, the credits
and debits indicate that the entity (institution, role, role obligation, role act) is justified.
4. Applying the cumulative-weight test: determining the total significance of the various policy arguments to the role act.
5. Assessing the relevance of the policy arguments to the case at hand.
6. Resolving the dilemma by weighing the justification of the role act against the moral
offense of performing it.
7. Acting.
LUBAN, supra note 38, at 140.
104. Id.
105. Luban, supra note 70, at 896; see also WENDEL, supra note 6, at 46.
106. Luban, supra note 70, at 895.
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rial analysis, critics have contended, may be too much to ask of “a harried
tax lawyer on April 12.”107
One response that theorists give to the too-complex-for-ordinary-lawyers criticism is that deliberating about the justifications for one’s professional role in a particular case is not as hard as it looks when you try to
break down the steps and describe them on paper. In fact, complex reasoning is something we do all the time without knowing it. “If you try to enumerate the mental operations involved in doing your week’s grocery
shopping,” Luban suggested by analogy—enumerating how many people
you need to feed, figuring out how many meals there will be, what menus to
cook, what ingredients you have, what ingredients you need to buy, etc.—
“it seems astonishing that you eat at all.”108
Moreover, theorists respond, lawyers can fall back on general rules
and internalized professional norms to resolve many run-of-the-mill ethical
questions that arise repeatedly in day-to-day practice.109 As Simon noted,
practitioners routinely rely on tactical rules of thumb like “never ask a question [on cross-examination to which] you don’t know the answer” and deviate from these rules of thumb when the circumstances suggest a different
course, reserving “subtle and elaborate analysis of tactical choices” for situations in which “time permits and the stakes are high.”110 Theories of professional role typically suggest variation based on the general context or
nature of practice: criminal, civil, litigation, or transactional.111 Although
lawyers must think through the broad parameters of professional obligation
in their chosen careers at some point, lawyers need not reinvent the wheel
every time they face an ethical dilemma.112
The theorists’ instinct that lawyers in practice develop an internalized
sense of professional role accords with cognitive psychologists’ understanding of the way experts solve problems. In the process of developing professional expertise, professionals internalize scripts or schemas for structuring
the relevant information.113 Experts circumvent the limits on the quantity of
information that the human brain can process “at least in part because they
have organized their knowledge into libraries of patterns” that allow them
107. Id. at 894.
108. LUBAN, supra note 38, at 141.
109. SIMON, supra note 6, at 157.
110. Id.
111. See generally LUBAN, supra note 38, at 58–66 (describing the difference between the
criminal and civil law paradigms); SIMON, supra note 6, at 197–203 (describing an enforcement
regime based on the development of context-specific rules and norms); WENDEL, supra note 6, at
187–94 (discussing variation in fidelity to law in criminal litigation and civil counseling and
transactional practice).
112. LUBAN, supra note 38, at 141.
113. Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Problem Solving, 11
CLINICAL L. REV. 149, 167 (2004).
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to work through a problem more quickly and efficiently.114 When confronted with a new problem, experts draw on these internalized schemas to
hone in on the relevant facts, analyze the problem according to its deep
structure, and formulate solutions based on previous experience with structurally similar problems.115 An expert problem solver will move through
the intermediate steps of reasoning so automatically and unconsciously that
the process will seem intuitive.116
When considered as an aspect of expert problem solving, the complexity of professional judgment seems more apparent than real. When a theorist in legal ethics tries to explain how a lawyer would move through all the
intermediate steps of applying his or her theory of professional role to a
complex factual situation, the considerations that come into play sound
dauntingly complex. However, a reasoning process that looks complex on
paper is not necessarily going to be either too time consuming or too intellectually taxing in the hands of a seasoned professional.
2. The Abstraction of Theory
A more serious problem with applying theories of professional role
directly to the exercise of professional judgment is that the simplicity and
abstraction of such theories make them largely inaccessible as guides to
practice. Legal ethics is famously characterized by a plurality of professional role conceptions and accompanying professional values: Lawyers are
representatives of clients, officers of the legal system, and public citizens
having special responsibilities for the quality of justice.117 Each of the comprehensive theories in legal ethics discussed in Part II resolves the tensions
between lawyers’ conflicting professional obligations by demonstrating
how apparent conflicts can be reconciled as manifestations of a single underlying value: morality, justice, or fidelity to law. The resolution of competing professional values into a comprehensive theory of legal ethics thus
provides a single unifying principle for legal ethics and in the process simplifies and abstracts lawyers’ competing professional duties.
The simplification and abstraction that characterizes comprehensive
theories in legal ethics is endemic in any theoretical project. In the world of
theoretical explanation, elegance and simplicity are virtues. In the process
of developing a comprehensive explanation that grounds and unifies divergent values, theory must significantly oversimplify and abstract from life. A
theory that has too many qualifications and exceptions—that takes too
114. STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING
COUNSELING 353 (2009).
115. Krieger, supra note 113, at 167–68; see also Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of
Nature: Instinct and Automaticity in Legal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (1998)
(discussing different protocols between experienced and inexperienced problem solvers).
116. ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 114, at 351; Weinstein, supra note 115, at 26.
117. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2011).
AND
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many divergent possibilities into account—might be a more accurate
description of the complexity of life, but it would not be a very good theory.
Consider an analogy to moral reasoning. When we encounter a challenging moral issue—for example, whether to authorize a hospital to terminate life support for one’s beloved relative in an irreversible coma—we
may experience the pull of conflicting moral values, like respect for our
loved one’s autonomy and dignity, respect for human life, the desire to end
suffering, and the desire not to impose unnecessary cost on others. We ask
ourselves: What would my loved one have wanted me to do? Is it worth the
discomfort to her and the expense to others to prolong her life needlessly?
Does mitigation of discomfort and expense ever provide a good enough
reason to terminate a human life?
Some of the great moral philosophers of all time have proposed basic
principles designed to provide answers to these kinds of moral questions.
Kant’s Categorical Imperative suggests that we consider whether the maxim
of our action could be willed as a universal law.118 Bentham’s Utility Principle urges that we apply a hedonic calculus to determine what action
would serve the greatest good for the greatest number.119 Yet, most people
do not dust off their copies of these great works to get a direct answer to a
difficult moral question. High moral theory just is not that useful. When we
try to apply an abstract theoretical framework directly to a real-life situation, we get bogged down in the process of filling in the steps that take us
down from the higher levels of abstraction to the messiness and complexity
of the world we experience. Someone attempting to apply the Categorical
Imperative to a moral question would likely stumble at the first step: trying
to formulate the maxim of a proposed course of action.
Theories of professional role are closer to the ground than Bentham or
Kant; but because comprehensive theories of professional role have the
simplified and abstracted quality of good theory, the problems with applying high moral theory to practice are applicable to theories of professional
role as well. Consider, for example, how a lawyer might be guided by existing theories of professional role on the question presented in Part I:
whether to pay the fee for a court-ordered drug awareness class that is a
condition of the client’s consent decree. The moral activist approach would
deem the lawyer to be in the criminal defense paradigm, in which there are
strong justifications for partisan advocacy. However, it would say little
about what either partisan duty or morality would dictate regarding the
question of paying the fee for the court-ordered program. The contextual
justice approach would advise taking the action that best contributed to justice in the circumstances, as informed by the underlying principles and
118. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 33–37 (Allen W.
Wood trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785).
119. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789).
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background values immanent in the law, but it would not provide a clear
answer to the key question: whether paying for the drug treatment class
contributes to the underlying principles and goals of the juvenile justice
system or detracts from them. The fidelity to law approach would consider
what course of action would best reflect the intended purposes of the relevant substantive and procedural law and demonstrate respect for the law
and legal system, but it would not really answer the question of whether the
lawyer’s payment of the fee for the court-ordered program usefully supplemented or circumvented those rules, procedures, and systems.
In each case, the theory of legal ethics would tell the lawyer what
underlying considerations should guide professional judgment. However,
none provide much additional guidance in applying those considerations to
the facts at hand because the values that are assigned the highest priority—
morality, justice, or respect for law and legal processes—are insufficiently
specified in the theory itself. The devil is in the details, and the details come
into focus only as one steps down from the abstraction of theory to its implementation in practice.
3. A Multiplicity of Theories
In addition to the problem of abstraction, the theoretical project in legal ethics, when taken as a whole, has generated a confusing multiplicity of
theoretical frameworks.120 Paradoxically, although each theory strives to
simplify and unify a lawyer’s professional duties, the generation of multiple
theories creates an additional level of choice from the perspective of a lawyer facing an ethical question. The question, “What should I do?” becomes
complicated by the metaethical question, “How should I choose which
framework to use for determining what I should do?”121 Theorists disagree—often vigorously—among themselves about the answer to the
metaethical question. Going down the rabbit hole of theory for guidance on
practical questions is likely to be more frustrating than illuminating, as “[a]
few minutes spent glancing through the articles in any of the leading philosophy journals, with their cramped, obsessive epicycles on philosophers’ objections to each other” will quickly reveal.122
As a philosophy graduate student in the mid-1980s, the problem of a
multiplicity of ethical theories was driven home for me when I taught discussion sections in large-enrollment Introduction to Ethics courses populated primarily by undergraduate business majors. I imagine that the school
of business intended its requirement that each business major take three
credits of ethics to raise the ethical standards of the business world. What I
120.
170–71
121.
122.

See Alice Woolley, The Legitimate Concerns of Legal Ethics, 13 LEGAL ETHICS 168,
(2010).
See Paul Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 500–02 (1999).
Luban, supra note 70, at 897.
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saw instead was the look of bewilderment on the faces of the future business leaders of America as one theory of ethics after another was paraded
before them and found to be inadequate in one way or another. Over the
course of the semester, the students seemed to be concluding what one
might well conclude after a deep plunge into theory: that there are a lot of
different ways of approaching a moral issue and all of them are wrong.123
Perhaps the most encouraging thing that can be said about the multiplicity of theoretical frameworks is that for many questions, it does not
matter which framework you choose because different theoretical roads
often lead to the same destination.124 This, at least, was the conclusion of
Albert Jonsen and Joseph Toulmin based on their experience working with
a national commission set up by Congress in 1974 to review regulations
relating to human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research.125 The
commission was comprised of eleven members—scientists, philosophers,
theologians, and laypersons—representing a variety of different religious
and political backgrounds and viewpoints.126 According to Jonsen and
Toulmin, “[a]gain and again the commission’s deliberations displayed the
same unforeseen feature.”127 When presented with actual case studies, the
commissioners were in substantial agreement about the results; it was only
when commissioners began to explain the reasons for reaching these results
that serious disagreement emerged.128
Jonsen and Toulmin are philosophers in the field of bioethics, where
the problems of directly applying ethical theory to practical judgment have
led theorists to reject a “top-down” deductive approach to ethical questions
that arise in the practice of medicine and to develop more pragmatic uses of
theory.129 The next section examines in more detail the pragmatic project in
medical ethics, seeking guidance for developing the appropriate relationship
between theory and practice in legal ethics.

123. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 337
(5th ed. 2001) (noting that the unfortunate effect of a “textbook approach to moral theory [that]
presents several competing theories and then proceeds to criticize each one” is that “readers become skeptical about the value of ethical theory”).
124. Woolley, supra note 120, at 173.
125. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF
MORAL REASONING 16, 17 (1988).
126. Id. at 17.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 18; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 123, at 377 (“Convergence as
well as consensus about principles among a group of persons is common in assessing cases and
framing policies, even when deep theoretical differences divide the group.”).
129. John Arras, Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J.
983, 988–91 (1994).
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B. The Pragmatic Project in Medical Ethics: Principles and Paradigm
Case
In the field of biomedical ethics, theorists have largely rejected what
John Arras has called a “Consumer Reports” version of ethical consultation:
explaining what, in a given situation, a Kantian would do; what solution a
utilitarian would promote; what a natural rights theorist would advocate;
etc.130 As Arras points out, this approach “might not prove enormously
helpful to those doctors, nurses, and social workers who have not quite
figured out where they stand in the ongoing debate between the partisans of
Kant, Mill, and Locke.”131 Professionals in the medical field need to make
decisions; they cannot afford the luxury of waiting for moral theorists to
develop definitive answers to questions that have been the subject of “more
than two thousand years of ethical debate among philosophers with rival
views” without the emergence of a clear winner.132
In an effort to make theory more accessible and useful to practice,
leading biomedical ethicists Tom Beauchamp and James Childress developed a pragmatic approach to professional judgment—called “principlism”—which specifies a limited set of mid-level principles that “function as
guidelines for professional ethics.”133 Bioethicists do not purport to determine answers to every ethical question by reference to these principles;
indeed, they expect the principles to come into conflict, requiring further
specification or balancing in the context of particular cases.134 However, the
principles guide the exercise of professional judgment, keeping “judgments
principled without removing agent discretion.”135 A more radical pragmatic
approach—called “casuistry”—eschews reference to principles altogether,
in favor of reasoning by analogy from paradigm cases.136 The revival of
casuistry in biomedical ethics embraces moral reasoning as essentially practical rather than theoretical,137 views the locus of moral certainty in our
moral reactions to concrete cases,138 and uses our moral intuitions in paradigm cases to derive general maxims that give presumptive answers for
analogous cases.139
Although principlism and casuistry have been considered rival views
in the field of biomedical ethics, more refined versions of each have begun
130. Id. at 989.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 123, at 12.
134. Id. at 386–87.
135. Tom L. Beauchamp, Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J.
955, 957 (1994).
136. See RICHARD B. MILLER, CASUISTRY AND MODERN ETHICS: A POETICS OF PRACTICAL
REASONING 4–6 (1996); JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 125, at 250–57.
137. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 125, at 24–36.
138. See id. at 18.
139. Id. at 306–07.
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to converge into a pragmatic approach that utilizes both paradigm cases and
principles to guide ethical decision making.140 Moderate versions of casuistry admit that principles, theories, and cultural norms play a role in locating a situation within the taxonomy of paradigm cases and in deriving the
maxims that allow one to move analogously from case to case.141 And, the
leading proponents of principlism have conceded that their set of guiding
principles is largely indeterminate and must be further specified through
application to the more complex facts of specific cases.142 Principlists now
seek “general coherence and a mutual support among the accepted norms”
by a process of “matching, pruning, and developing” the principles through
interaction with considered moral judgments in paradigm cases.143 As
Beauchamp and Childress put it, neither general principles nor paradigm
cases can do the job alone: “Principles need to be made specific for cases,
and case analysis needs illumination from general principles.”144
Although these schools of thought still differ on several scores, they
share a view that pragmatic practical reasoning involves dialectic between
generality and particularity, allowing theory to inform practice and practice
to specify theory. This dialectic echoes John Rawls’s notion of the “reflective equilibrium” reached through the process of bringing our moral judgments and the underlying conceptions of justice that best explain or justify
them into satisfactory balance.145 We begin the process of reflective equilibrium, Rawls posited, with our “considered moral judgments”—the judgments in which we have the most confidence because we make them under
conditions that are least likely to be distorted by self-interest, haste, or
fear.146 Theory formulates the general principles that govern these judgments, rationally explaining and justifying them.147 And, this theoretical
exploration provides us the opportunity to revise our considered moral
judgments upon reflection. According to Rawls, “the best account of a person’s sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his
examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his
judgments in reflective equilibrium” after he has considered alternative proposed conceptions of justice and “either revised his judgments to accord
with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions.”148
140. See Arras, supra note 129, at 1003.
141. Id. at 1002–03.
142. Id. at 994–99; Beauchamp, supra note 135, at 959.
143. Beauchamp, supra note 135, at 961.
144. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 123, at 397.
145. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46–53 (1971). Beauchamp and Childress make specific reference to Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, embracing it as part of the core methodology for
their “coherence theory” of bioethical reasoning. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 123, at
397–98.
146. RAWLS, supra note 145, at 47–48.
147. Id. at 51.
148. Id. at 48.
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The use of paradigm cases and mid-level principles that exemplify and
explain competing professional values is pragmatically useful because it
tracks the kinds of judgment that professionals exercise in other aspects of
their professional work. Jonsen and Toulmin, for example, describe the process of medical diagnosis as a form of practical rather than deductive reasoning.149 And, they analogize practical choices about what moral
principles to employ to the strategic choices a lawyer makes in settling on
the legal theory of a case.150 Different ethical considerations, like consequentialist arguments or appeals to patient autonomy, have stronger weight
in some cases than in others.151 Like lawyers choosing between tort theory
or agency theory in pursuing a client’s injury claim, ethicists must be attuned to the persuasive power of particular moral theories in the specific
facts of the case at hand.152 Experts in applied ethical methodology assess
the persuasive and rhetorical pull of different principles or paradigms in the
situation,153 and “the final judgments usually turn on a fine-grained analysis
of the particularities of the case.”154
In a series of law review articles, Paul Tremblay has considered the
utility of the bioethical model of casuistry for legal ethics; and though he
sides decidedly with casuistry over principlism, his insights apply more
generally to both of the pragmatic models.155 Tremblay noted that the casebased analogical reasoning employed in bioethics describes the kind of ethical reasoning in which lawyers already engage and that a deeper study of
bioethics can help the legal profession “examine, critique, and make more
explicit our own current practice.”156 Legal ethics, he observed, has already
developed a set of “stock stories” and paradigm cases used in professional
responsibility textbooks to illustrate the limits of partisan advocacy.157 Legal ethics contain a limited set of mid-level principles as well, reflected
most recently in the ABA’s articulation of the core professional values of
loyalty, confidentiality, independent professional judgment, avoidance of
conflicts of interest, and promotion of access to justice.158
149. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 125, at 36–46.
150. Id. at 297–99.
151. Id. at 299.
152. Id. at 297–98.
153. Id. at 298–99; Tremblay, supra note 121, at 521–23.
154. Arras, supra note 129, at 1001.
155. See generally Paul R. Tremblay, The Role of Casuistry in Legal Ethics: A Tentative
Inquiry, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 493 (1994) [hereinafter Tremblay, Role of Casuistry]; Tremblay,
supra note 121; Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 659 (2002). Tremblay notes the reformed version of principlism that significantly
closes the gap between the two methods. Tremblay, supra note 121, at 506–08. And, his description of how to apply a casuistic approach in legal ethics uses principles like autonomy and beneficence as anchors for the maxims that derive from paradigm cases. Id. at 534.
156. Tremblay, Role of Casuistry, supra note 155, at 499.
157. Tremblay, supra note 121, at 538–39.
158. The articulation of these “core values” came in response to efforts by the ABA to permit
and regulate multidisciplinary practice. Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70
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A pragmatic project in legal ethics would focus on the mid-level principles of legal ethics—reflected in the core values of legal professionalism—and use difficult paradigm cases to further specify those principles as
well as to explore their interplay in situations where they come into conflict.
The goal of a pragmatic project is not to bring conflicting principles into a
final harmonious settlement, but to understand each principle better in light
of its underlying values and purposes. A fuller understanding of the core
values of legal ethics helps identify the situations in which the justifications
for a particular value—like confidentiality or loyalty or access to justice—
are particularly strong and to differentiate them from situations in which its
justifications are weaker. Such understanding more directly supports the exercise of sensitive professional judgment guided by underlying principles
that the Rules contemplate.
Analysis of paradigm cases plays an important role in analyzing the
scope and meaning of these core values. For example, contrast the values of
loyalty and confidentiality in the Robert Garrow “hidden bodies” case discussed above159—where a lawyer representing a man charged with murder
refused to reveal information about the location of the victims of his client’s
other murders—with the way loyalty and confidentiality operate in the case
of William Macumber.160 In 1974, Macumber was arrested for a 1962
shooting of an Arizona couple that had remained unsolved for twelve
years.161 Lawyer Thomas O’Toole came forward with information that his
former client, Ernie Valenzuela, had confessed to the crime in 1967.162
O’Toole had not revealed his client’s confidence at the time of the confesFORDHAM L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2001). I do not mean to imply that the core values articulated by
the ABA are the only principles that ought to count in a pragmatic project in legal ethics. The
ABA list, for example, does not include any specific principles relating to lawyers’ duties to
ensure the proper functioning of law or the legal system, which seems a glaring omission in light
of the ABA’s recognition in the Preamble of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct that
lawyers play an important role as “officer[s] of the legal system.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶¶ 1, 5 (2011).
159. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
160. A recent account of this case is available in a three-part series of articles in The Arizona
Republic. John Faherty, Arizona Murder Mystery: Guilt of Man in 1962 Killings Thrown into
Question, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 5, 2011, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/06/03/
20110603arizona-murder-william-macumber-part-1.html [hereinafter Faherty, Guilt of Man in
1962 Killings]; John Faherty, Arizona Murder Mystery: A Killer Speaks, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 5,
2011, http://www.azcentral.com/community/scottsdale/articles/2011/06/05/20110605arizona-murder-william-macumber-part-2-scottsdale.html [hereinafter Faherty, A Killer Speaks]; John
Faherty, Arizona Murder Mystery: Conspiracy Theory, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 5, 2011, http://
www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/06/05/20110605arizona-murder-william-macumber-part3.html.
161. Faherty, Guilt of Man in 1962 Killings, supra note 160. Macumber was charged when his
estranged wife approached the police with information that he confessed the murders to her. Id.
Although Macumber’s confession was corroborated by a palm print found on the victim’s car,
allegations remain that Macumber’s estranged wife—who worked as a secretary in the sheriff’s
department—planted her ex-husband’s print in the evidence box. Faherty, A Killer Speaks, supra
note 160.
162. Faherty, A Killer Speaks, supra note 160.
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sion, but by the time another man was charged with the crimes, his former
client Valenzuela had died in a prison knife fight.163 Each case presents the
question of when or in what circumstances a lawyer ought to reveal a client’s confession to prior unsolved crimes. Revealing such a confidence
works substantially against the interests of the client by exposing the client
to additional charges and criminal sanctions, invoking a basic underlying
principle of client loyalty: that lawyers should not use confidential information to the detriment of their clients.164 The core value of confidentiality
provides an additional and independent reason for lawyers to remain silent,
based on a larger interest in maintaining the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship and encouraging clients to reveal potentially harmful information to their lawyers.165 However, the values of loyalty and confidentiality
give way in circumstances where death or serious bodily injury can be
avoided only by revelation of a client confidence, suggesting that the values
of loyalty and confidentiality are not absolute, but must be balanced against,
and can be overridden by, the avoidance of pressing public harm.166
Lawyers exercising sensitive professional judgment on the question of
whether to reveal the client’s confidences in this contrasting pair of cases
may come to different conclusions: some may favor revelation in both
cases; some in neither case; and some may differentiate between the two
cases. In the Garrow case, the harm against which the values of client loyalty and confidentiality must be balanced is the public fear and uncertainty
caused by an unsolved violent crime and the anguish of family members not
knowing the fate of their missing relatives. Many lawyers would not find
those public harms sufficient to override their duties to protect their client
from additional criminal charges. The Macumber case initially looked similar, but by the time Macumber was charged with the crime, O’Toole’s need
to protect his former client’s interests was significantly diminished by his
client’s subsequent death, and the public harm associated with keeping the
confidence had escalated with the possibility that an innocent man would be
convicted of a crime he did not commit. However, although the principles
163. Id. In that case, the trial court ruled that the attorney’s testimony was inadmissible on the
ground of attorney-client privilege. State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976).
164. This principle is reflected in the proscription against using confidential information to the
disadvantage of a former client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(1) (2011); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(a) (2011) (“[T]he lawyer may not
use or disclose confidential client information . . . if there is a reasonable prospect that doing so
will adversely affect a material interest of the client.”).
165. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (“A fundamental principle in the clientlawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not
reveal information relating to the representation . . . . This contributes to the trust that is the
hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”); see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S.
399, 407 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client).
166. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (“A lawyer may reveal information relating
to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”). This exception “recognizes the
overriding value of life and physical integrity.” Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 6.
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underlying client loyalty are significantly different in the two cases and the
public harm is significantly greater in the Macumber case, the principle that
client confidences should be maintained to protect trust and integrity in the
lawyer-client relationship remains a constant in both cases. Regardless of
the outcome a lawyer reaches, the analysis of these contrasting cases will
help to clarify and specify the core values of loyalty and confidentiality in
light of their underlying principles.
C. The Role of Theory in the Ethics of Practice
If the basic methodology of legal ethics is more properly located in a
pragmatic approach that draws on a plurality of specified mid-level principles and core values, as illuminated by the close analysis of paradigm cases,
one might conclude that the theoretical project in legal ethics of constructing, critiquing, and defending comprehensive theories of legal ethics has
little or no relevance to practice. This conclusion, however, would be mistaken. Although comprehensive theories of legal ethics are not useful as
direct guides to ethical deliberation, the theoretical project plays an important role in developing and honing the more useful tools of mid-level principles, professional values, and maxims. The distance and abstraction of
theory can provide a more comprehensive viewpoint from which to map the
terrain on which professional judgment is exercised. And, both the distance
and rigor of theory provide a helpful corrective against the potential for
manipulation and abuse inherent in the development of shared norms within
a professional community.
1. Accountability and Self-Dealing
A purely “bottom-up” model of ethical reasoning that depends on
moral intuitions and shared professional norms may “lack[ ] critical distance from cultural blindness, rash analogy, and mere popular opinion.”167
One reason that casuistry needs to be “revived” is that, by the seventeenth
century, it had famously “degenerated into a form of reasoning characterized by moral permissiveness and disingenuous argument” that permitted
deployment of moral arguments in favor of well-born penitents seeking absolution.168 Similar abuse is possible in professional communities, and law
has its own not-so-glorious history of using professional training and professional ethics as cover for protectionism.169 As Susan Koniak has shown,
normative understandings within the legal profession diverge from and
compete with the formal law of lawyering, often giving higher priority to
167. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 123, at 395.
168. MILLER, supra note 136, at 4; see also JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 125, at 15.
169. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989) (describing the restrictive
practices historically employed by American lawyers to dampen competition among lawyers and
with outsiders).

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-2\UST203.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 32

7-DEC-12

PROFESSIONAL ROLE AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT

9:31

281

values of client loyalty and confidentiality.170 Yet, empirical studies of the
legal profession reveal systematic patterns of behavior counter to these
norms where lawyers’ professional or reputational interests fail to align
with client loyalty and zealous advocacy.171 And, in the culture of big-firm
corporate lawyering, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish the zealous
pursuit of client interests from more problematic patterns of file churning
and billing fraud.172
Comprehensive theories of professional role provide a useful corrective to these protectionist and self-dealing tendencies by demanding more
rigorous theoretical justification of the received wisdom and tacit norms
typically employed to defend professional decision making in practice.
Some of the earliest theoretical critiques in legal ethics sought to correct
lawyers’ lax deployment of client-centered norms to excuse overzealous
tactics that had exceeded their proper justification.173 As David Luban put
it, “discussions of the adversary system usually stop where they ought to
start, with a chorus of deeply felt but basically unexamined rhetoric.”174 By
demanding more rigorous justification for what might otherwise be an “adversary system excuse,” theorists in legal ethics have helped to further hone
and specify the situations in which zealous advocacy is appropriate and the
situations in which it may be a cloak for the pursuit of lawyer selfinterest.175
2. Theory as Theater
Stemming abuse is not the only function that theories of professional
role play in shaping the exercise of professional judgment. As experience in
biomedical ethics has shown, successful deployment of practical reasoning
depends on internalizing an understanding of the circumstances in which
different principles or paradigms have greater or lesser weight or salience.
In the theoretical project in legal ethics, theorists propose and justify a single unitary value—morality, justice, and fidelity to law—to coordinate divergent professional duties; and those proposals are in turn critiqued and
modified, exposing both the strengths and weaknesses of each various approach. Although the multiplicity of competing theories of professional role
170. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1485–86 (1992).
171. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
WIS. L. REV. 1529, 1544–50 (1984).
172. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 705–09 (1990) (describing the
practice of “running the meter” to bill clients for nonessential work). For a review of other dishonest billing practice, see Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense
Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (1999).
173. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
174. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 27.
175. Id. at 28 (“Getting paid by the client, of course, makes it easier to ignore the difference
between courtroom and other activities: $800 an hour has been known to buy a lot of
Professionalism.”).
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has the potential to confuse or dismay a practitioner attempting to choose
among them, the theoretical discourse can also reveal important insights if
approached with the attitude that each theory teaches an important lesson
about some aspect of lawyers’ role in the legal system and in society.176
Biomedical ethicist Albert Jonsen has used the metaphor of travel by
hot air balloon and travel by bicycle to contrast the worlds of theory and
practice and to describe the relationship between them.177 “From the balloon,” Jonsen wrote, “one gets a wide view of the landscape and the horizons are far on all sides. From the bicycle, one sees only the bumpy road
ahead, the fallen tree limbs, and the dogs in the bushes.”178 Theory, symbolized by the balloon, “is very loosely tethered to the ground and can float
quite free . . . [and] sees the details of human life only from a great distance
and often not at all.”179 Practical judgment, represented by the bicycle, “encounters many variables, and the path of reasoning cannot be navigated
without taking them into account.”180 There is no direct connection between
the balloon in the sky and the bicycle on the ground—the balloonist can
communicate with the bicyclist only by shouting—but after the balloonist is
back on the ground, “he or she can tell the earthbound much about the
general topography, informing the bicyclist to look for certain landmarks in
the earthly bike trip, warning that over the next hill is an unpassable river,
indicating that the bike is moving in a circle and going nowhere.”181 A
shout from the balloon can warn a bicyclist that he or she is about to go off
a cliff and “can warn that a particular resolution of a problem has implications that the bicyclist would want to avoid.”182 Jonsen’s metaphor illustrates the limited role that theory can and should play: The lesson he draws
is that “communication between balloon and bicycle may be important, but
it need be only occasional and sporadic.”183 I see a more robust role of
theoretical discourse in providing indirect guidance to the pragmatic
project.
Using a different metaphor, I think of theory as providing a stage on
which different stories about the priority and centrality of competing professional values can be performed. In this metaphor, the competing professional values, like morality, justice, client loyalty, and the rule of law, are
characters in a play. Different theorists place different characters in the
leading heroic role. As the story told by each theorist unfolds, the hero faces
challenges and demonstrates how those challenges can be overcome. The
176. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 123, at 377.
177. Albert R. Jonsen, Of Balloons and Bicycles, or the Relationship Between Ethical Theory
and Practical Judgment, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 1991, at 14, 14.
178. Id. at 14.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 15.
181. Id. at 15–16.
182. Id. at 16.
183. Id.
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protagonist in one theorist’s story may be the villain in the story told by
another. In the story told by the moral activist approach, for example, clients are the villains, greedily urging their lawyers to push up or past the
limits of the law, and lawyers’ heroic appeals to moral judgment to constrain their clients’ greed rescue society from harm. In the story told by the
fidelity-to-law approach, the positive law plays the heroic role of rescuing
society from irreconcilable moral conflict through fair and inclusive democratic process, and lawyers’ exercise of moral authority to prevent clients
from reaching the limits of the law undermines and interferes with law’s
heroic achievement. In a play, the plots of the stories told on the stage of
theory are less detailed, the characters more exaggerated, and the props less
elaborate than they are in real life. Unlike life, a play moves tidily through
conflict to resolution and ends when the curtain falls. But, the stories we see
played out on stage often stay with us as we leave the darkened theater and
return to the daylight and hubbub of our untidy, ambiguous, and continually
unfolding lives.
There is something grandiose about a comprehensive theory of professional role that seeks to encompass all of lawyers’ conflicting professional
duties within the boundaries of one unifying principle. It is easy to play off
that grandiosity and to point out where a theory of professional role falls
short, what it leaves out, and where it goes wrong. But theories of legal
ethics can also be instructive. Writing about the usefulness of moral theory
to biomedical ethics, Beauchamp and Childress concluded that each attempt
at comprehensive moral theory was incomplete in some way, but each also
had a lesson to teach: “Where one theory is weak in accounting for some
part of the moral life, another is often strong. Although every general theory
clashes at some point with our considered moral convictions, each also articulates convictions that we should be reluctant to relinquish.”184
Though theories of professional role are much too simplified and abstract to provide direct guidance to practical judgment, and though each
comes complete with its own set of flaws, the narratives about professional
role that are played out on the simplified stage of theory can reveal deeper
truths about law and lawyering, especially if one focuses sympathetically on
the heroic aspects of each story. Wendel’s story about fidelity to law as the
central principle of legal ethics reminds lawyers not to take lightly the
moral weight of democratic consensus enacted into law and emphasizes the
important discipline that deference to authoritative legal sources can bring
to the exercise of professional judgment. Simon’s focus on contextual justice reminds lawyers not to forget that responsibility for justice may require
looking beyond the law and either drawing back from aggressive partisanship or using evasive or manipulative tactics to rebalance the scales of justice when the institutional competence of legal officials or standard
184. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 123, at 377.
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procedures is in question. And, Luban’s moral activism insists that lawyers
remain ultimately accountable as moral agents, answerable for the choices
they make in their professional role, rather than slipping into the banality of
role-differentiated evil. Each of these considerations is important to remember in the exercise of professional judgment. If they were presented in a less
simplified and exaggerated form—if they were more realistically nuanced
and complex—these lessons might be lost.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between theory and practice in legal ethics is both
complex and interesting. Theories of professional role emerge inevitably in
the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the
basic principles underlying rules of professional conduct. Yet the theories
of professional role that guide the exercise of professional judgment remain
largely implicit in their operation. It would seem at first glance that the
comprehensive theories of legal ethics—which make those operative theories of role explicit for purposes of critique and reconstruction—can provide an important missing link between lawyers’ day-to-day exercise of
professional judgment and the political, jurisprudential, and moral theory
that justifies lawyers’ role in society. Indeed, the comprehensive theories of
legal ethics purport to do just that, providing rubrics or frameworks for
applying their insights directly to practice. Yet, the theoretical project in
legal ethics falls prey to the problems of all theoretical projects: The simplicity and abstraction that make for an elegant theory create too much distance to be of much practical use. This Article has argued that the more
pragmatic project in biomedical ethics, which uses mid-level principles to
analyze ethical decision making in paradigm cases, is a more promising
model for providing the necessary links between theory and practice. Yet,
this does not mean that the more abstract and simplified work in theoretical
legal ethics has no pragmatic value. Rather, the generation and critique of
comprehensive theories of legal ethics can enhance the pragmatic project by
providing a check on the self-dealing tendencies of a self-regulated profession and by playing out the implications of prioritizing one value over another on the simplified stage that theoretical abstraction creates.

